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Cartelization in Gas Markets: Studying the Potential for a “Gas 
OPEC”1 
 
S.A. Gabriel2, K.E. Rosendahl3, Ruud Egging2, H.G. Avetisyan2, S. 
Siddiqui2 
27 May, 2011 
Abstract: Natural gas is increasingly important as a fuel for electric power generation as well as other 
uses due to its environmental advantage over other fossil fuels.  Using the World Gas Model, a large-
scale energy equilibrium system based on a complementarity formulation, this paper analyzes possible 
future gas cartels and their effects on gas markets in a number of regions across the world.  In addition, 
scenarios related to lower transport costs and decreased unconventional gas supply in the United States 
are considered.   
Keywords: natural gas, market equilibrium, complementarity model, energy 
1. Introduction  
Natural gas markets are currently in the process of dramatic changes, such as globalization of these 
markets (EMF, 2007; Huntington, 2009), rising shares of LNG trade and spot contracts (WEO 2008, IEA), 
and, last but not least, a substantial increase in the prospects of unconventional gas supply (Potential 
Gas Committee, 2010). These changes will alter the playing field for natural gas producers worldwide, 
and one particular question is whether cartelization in the international gas markets may arise and if so, 
what kinds of impacts it may have. 
 
In 2001, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) was founded in Tehran, as an international body 
representing the interests of gas-producing nations. Ever since, there have been regular speculations 
about whether GECF would turn into a gas cartel like OPEC, i.e., a so-called gas-OPEC (Hallouche, 2006; 
Jaffe and Soligo, 2006; Wagbara, 2007). GECF consists of 11 member countries, including the three 
biggest in gas reserves: Russia, Iran and Qatar. It also has member countries in Africa and Latin 
America.4 Together, in 2009, GECF accounted for 64% of remaining gas reserves, 34% of current gas 
production, and 41% and 54% of current pipeline and LNG export, respectively (BP, 2010).  
 
1 We are grateful for funding from the Petrosam program of the Research Council of Norway (project #184739), 
and for comments from an anonymous referee. 
2 University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA 20901, Contact author: S. Gabriel, sgabriel@umd.edu; other 
emails of University of Maryland co-authors: ruudegging-at-hotmail.com, havetisy@umd.edu, siddiqui@umd.edu. 
3 Statistics Norway, Oslo, Norway, ker@ssb.no 
4 The current members of GECF are (in descending order of reserves): Russia, Iran, Qatar, Nigeria, Venezuela, 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Equatorial Guinea. In addition, there are two observing 
members, Norway and Kazakhstan. (Source: www.gecforum.org, accessed June 2, 2010). 
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The mission of GECF is to “identify and promote measures and processes necessary to ensure that 
Member Countries derive the most value from their gas resources”, and to “promote the appropriate 
dialogue among gas producing and consuming countries to ensure (…) fair pricing for both producers 
and consumers” (www.gecforum.org). This mission can be interpreted in various ways, and recent 
statements from different member countries show disagreement about issues like coordinated supply 
cuts.5 Currently, however, the two most important member countries Russia and Qatar seem reluctant 
to such suggestions.6 
 
Russia, Iran and Qatar together hold about half of the world’s remaining gas reserves, and their 
positions will obviously determine whether GECF will turn into an effective gas cartel or not in the years 
to come. More generally, the effectiveness of any gas cartel (GECF or not) will depend on the decisions 
made by these countries. Both Russia and Iran are also big consumers of natural gas, and it is not in the 
interest of these countries to raise their domestic gas prices above their alternative costs of gas. Thus, 
what is relevant here is their exports of gas and how export cuts may influence on export profits. 
Furthermore, this could free up more gas supply for domestic consumers, possibly reducing gas prices 
within GECF countries. 
 
The question analyzed in this paper is how a potential cartelization of international gas markets could 
affect these markets in the coming decades. We first consider a gas cartel consisting of the GECF 
member countries. Then we expand the cartel to also include the Caspian region and subsequently the 
rest of the Middle East, too. Our aim is to investigate whether such a cartel could significantly alter 
regional gas prices and production/consumption. Additionally, to what degree the cartel members may 
benefit from cartelization is examined. The answer to the latter question may be important for the 
likelihood of a future gas cartel. 
 
Some gas consumers are concerned that a gas cartel will become as effective as OPEC has been in the 
crude oil market, resulting in higher gas prices due to curtailed production. Comaparing GECF to OPEC, 
there are both similarities and differences to be aware of. First, Middle Eastern countries are central in 
both organizations. However, whereas Saudi Arabia is the dominant country in OPEC, Russia is the most 
important country in GECF (see discussion of Russia and “gas-OPEC” in Finon, 2007). Second, both GECF 
and OPEC have a majority of remaining global reserves, and a large but not majority of global 
production. Third, the gas market has some important characteristics that differ from the oil market, 
which affects the impacts and likelihood of cartelization (see below). Finally, OPEC did not play a 
significant role in the oil market the first decade after it was founded, and now GECF is heading towards 
its 10-year anniversary. 
 
One important difference between the oil and gas markets is that transport costs are much higher for 
gas than for oil. As a consequence, it has been more common to talk about regional gas markets than a 
                                                            
5 For instance, prior to the GECF meeting in April 2010, Algeria called for coordinated cuts of gas production by 
GECF members, but this was not agreed upon at the meeting (WGI, 2010). 
6 Although Iran has somewhat bigger gas reserves and production than Qatar, its gas consumption is large and 
currently at the same level as its gas production, implying that Iran is not a net exporter of gas at the moment. This 
could change in the future if Iran manages to increase its production and export capacity. 
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global gas market. In addition, gas sales in Europe and Asia have been dominated by long-term 
contracts, with only a small share of spot sales.  Similar market structure is true also in the United States 
where long-term contracts dominate over spot market sales. Volumes of LNG purchased in spot market 
are low but show relative increase in market share. In 1987 the share of international LNG trade was 
1.5% while in 2002 it increased up to 8% (Britoand Hartley, 2007).  The current trend, however, is 
towards a more globalized gas market with more spot sales, partly due to lower costs of LNG transport 
over the last decade. Nevertheless, the significant transport costs have some important implications for 
the cartelization issue. First, it presumably implies that the effects of cartelization will differ across 
regions, as regional prices will differ because of the transport costs. For instance, the U.S. market is 
located further away from most GECF countries than the European and Asian markets. Furthermore, the 
United States is no longer expected to import significant amounts of gas in the coming decades, which 
was the common thinking a few years ago (see below). Thus, we should expect less impact in the U.S. 
market than in the European and Asian markets. 
 
Second, the gains from cartelization will not only depend on the total cut in supply from the cartel as a 
whole, but also how much each member country cuts back. For instance, it could be the case that it is 
optimal for the cartel as a whole that one member cuts back its production substantially whereas 
another member hardly at all, if they export gas to different regions. Clearly, this makes it more 
challenging to share the cartel benefits compared to in the oil market, where OPEC’s total revenues are 
more or less unaffected by which member country cuts back on supply.7 If transfers of profit are difficult 
to agree upon, divergence of interests among cartel members could put an additional restriction on the 
cartel’s optimal behavior. Thus, several authors have argued that effective cartelization in the gas 
market may not be readily accomplished (Energy Business Review, 2005; Finon, 2007; Finon and 
Locatelli, 2008). Others have argued against this, positing that the natural gas “troika” composed of 
Russia, Iran, and Qatar could “produce more natural gas at a much cheaper cost for the U.S. market, 
effectively shutting down the Barnett Shale and other similar resource plays” (Fort Worth Business 
Press, 2008). 
 
The likelihood of a gas cartel obviously depends on how the gas market develops over the next years 
and decades. Here it is important to emphasize two important drivers for the future gas market:, 
unconventional gas and gas transportation, and to investigate how sensitive the impacts of cartelization 
may be to the development of these two factors. 
 
Recently, the role of unconventional gas has greatly increased due to engineering advances such as 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling (NPC, 2007).8 The projected role of shale gas in particular, 
especially in the United States but also elsewhere (Skagen, 2010), has lately been a major force in the 
increasing prominence of unconventional gas. In 2008, Cambridge Energy Research Associates indicated 
that this unconventional gas production could help delay by a decade the United States’ need for 
substantial LNG imports (The Economist, October 4, 2008). Indeed, the Potential Gas Committee has 
concluded that the United States proved reserves of gas increased from 2006 to 2008 by a huge 35.4% 
 
7 Of course, different costs of extraction can imply that it is more profitable for the cartel as a whole that the high-
cost producers cut back (this applies to both gas and oil). 
8 Unconventional gas is defined as gas from tight sands, coalbed methane, and gas shales, and covers more low-
permeability reservoirs that produce mostly natural gas (no associated hydrocarbon liquids) (NPC, 2007). 
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from 43,387 to 58,739 billion cubic meters (Potential Gas Committee, 2010).Others such as the 
petroleum geologist Art Berman are more cautious about the ultimate supply due to the economics of 
producing shale gas (Cohen, 2009) or steeper decline rates for shale wells (Steffy, 2009). Additionally, 
there are also environmental risks with drilling for shale gas having to do with elevated levels of benzene 
in the water (National Public Radio, 2009ab) potentially due to the fracturing process for shale gas. 
These environmental considerations may inhibit future shale production. Indeed, the U.S. Congress has 
introduced two bills to 
 
“require the energy industry to disclose the chemicals it mixes with the water and sand it pumps 
underground in the fracturing process, information that has largely been protected as trade 
secrets.” (Propublica, 2009)  
 
These bills could have wide-ranging effects on the gas industry.  
This rise in unconventional gas should be contrasted with a similar anticipated large increase in liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) trade worldwide. In order to reach demand regions often far from the supply location 
gas must be shipped by pipeline or increasingly as LNG. As indicated in Figure 1, LNG’s share of inter-
regional gas trade is anticipated to rise, with the International Energy Agency forecasting that more than 
60% of internationally traded natural gas will be shipped as LNG by 2030 (WEO 2008, IEA). The increase 
in LNG trade observed over the last couple of decades is partly due to cost reductions in liquefaction and 
shipping during the 1990’s and a few years into the new century (see for example, Jensen, 2004). Since 
then, LNG costs have risen along with the general cost increase in the energy sector. If transportation 
costs should start to decline again, relative to other supply costs, the international gas market may 
become more integrated than today. 
A natural question is how will these two trends—increased unconventional gas supply and increased 
LNG trade—affect the global gas marketplace? On the one hand, increased shale and other 
unconventional gas supply, all else being equal, will lower prices; this has already been observed with 
the U.S. Henry Hub spot market prices in 2009 and 2010 substantially lower than in previous years 
(Figure 2 and  
Figure 3). With reduced need for gas import into the United States, the potential gains from coordinated 
supply cuts from a gas cartel will probably diminish relative to the U.S. market. On the other hand, the 
rise of LNG activity, especially if this occurs in spot markets as opposed to contracts, could put more 
market power in the hands of key players such as Russia, Iran, and Qatar which collectively possess 
more than 55% of the global proved reserves (EIA, 2008) or even additional market power if a gas cartel 
based on the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) is formed. A more integrated gas market, due to 
lower LNG and pipeline cost, could also reduce the market power of suppliers, allowing for more 
competition. The relevance of market power was observed with the temporary shutoff of gas from 
Russia to Ukraine over contract disputes, which ultimately affected further downstream customers in 
Europe in 2006 (New York Times, January 3, January 13, 2006) and again in 2009 (The Economist, 
January 10, January 17ab, 2009) . These two trends are potentially opposing and analysis should be done 
to determine the net effects on the global gas market. 
To our knowledge, there exist few previous in-depth studies that numerically analyze possible impacts of 
cartelization in international gas markets. One notable exception is Egging et al. (2009), which 
investigated the impacts of collusive behavior by the GECF members, using an earlier version of the 
model used in this paper. The model that is presented and applied here has several adjustments relative 
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to this earlier version, most importantly the current model allows for a representation of a cartel in 
accordance with economic theory. In the cartel studies extensions of the gas cartel beyond the GECF 
members are considered, which turn out to be crucial for both the impacts and the profitability of the 
cartel as well as the importance of unconventional gas and transportation costs. Lastly, the model has 
been improved to better represent cartel types of collusion (cf. Section 2 below). 
Although there exist only few numerical studies of gas cartelization, there are a number of studies that 
have numerically modeled market power in the European gas market. Examples of this are Golombek et 
al. (1995, 1998), Holz et al. (2008), Kalashnikov and Kalashnykova (2008), Lise and Hobbs (2009), and 
Tsygankova (2010). These models generally assume Nash-Cournot game between large exporting 
countries, similar to the assumption in our paper. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, the World Gas Model is presented and 
compared to relevant existing models; the formulation appears in the Appendix.  Section 3 describes the 
various scenarios considered with Section 4 providing the actual numerical results and discussion.  
Lastly, Section 5 offers some conclusions and directions for future work.  
2. The World Gas Model  
The World Gas Model (WGM) is a large-scale market equilibrium system developed by the University of 
Maryland9 in collaboration with Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (German Economic Institute 
for Economic Research) and Technische Universität-Dresden, (Egging et al., 2008ab, 2009, 2010), based 
on the earlier works by Gabriel et al. (2005ab) and Egging and Gabriel (2006). Its purpose is to simulate 
the global gas marketplace using principles from game theory, optimization, and engineering and to 
gauge the effects of market power discussed above. As shown in the Appendix, WGM is an instance of a 
mixed complementarity problem (MCP) (Facchinei and Pang, 2003) generalizing optimization and game 
theory problems.  MCPs or the related variational inequality problem have become quite prevalent in 
modeling large, complex systems such as the global gas market and offer much more flexibility and 
realism as compared to traditional single-objective optimization models. 
Unlike most other large-scale economic models for natural gas, the WGM allows some of the players to 
be strategic (i.e., to withhold supplies to force up prices for larger profits). This feature is important 
given recent events natural gas markets such as the Russian withholding of gas to Ukraine based on 
price disputes. The WGM includes the following market players: producers (given by equations A.1 to 
A.4 in the Appendix), traders (given by equations A.5 to A.13 in the Appendix) (dedicated trading arms of 
production companies), pipeline operators (given by equations A.14 to A.30 in the appendix), and 
consumers (given by the market clearing conditions B.1 to B.5 in the Appendix). The corresponding 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given in the Appendix (equations C1 to C31). Each of these players 
except consumers is modeled as optimizing their profits subject to engineering and/or consistency 
constraints. The traders are imbued with market power, playing Nash-Cournot, and the other players 
are price-takers. Gathering the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions (Facchinei and Pang, 
2003) for all the optimization problems along with market-clearing conditions gives rise to the overall 
 
9 National Science Foundation (DMS, Award #0106880), Principal Investigator, S.A. Gabriel, “Computational 
Methods for Equilibrium Problems with Micro-Level Data,” 09/01/2001-08/31/2005 and National Science 
Foundation (DMS, Award #0408943), Principal Investigator, S.A. Gabriel,  “Methods and Models for Stochastic 
Energy Market Equilibria, “08/01/2004-07/31/2008. 
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mixed complementarity problem (see Figure 4 for a depiction of the key model components and the 
Appendix for details on the actual formulation).  
2.1 Some Differences with Previous Versions of the World Gas Model 
 
In the WGM the market power lies with the traders, both representing the pipeline and the LNG 
deliveries. This differs from the previous versions of the model wherein only the traders exerted market 
power in (Egging et al. 2008ab); and WGM-2008 in Egging et al (2009, 2010) where the regasifier could 
also exert market power. The formulation implemented in Egging et al. (2009, 2010) was unable to 
adequately represent cartel types of collusion and was modified in the current formulation to allow 
traders to coordinate both pipeline and LNG flows originating from the same country.  
Usually storage facility operators provide a service. They inject, store and extract gas for a third party, 
and the storage operators do generally not own the (non-cushion) gas stored in the facility. In the WGM, 
the storage operators are modeled as regulated players. This is different from previous model versions 
wherein storage operators provided seasonal swing services by executing seasonal arbitrage. Also in 
former model versions price-undercutting behavior was observed in the high and peak demand seasons 
by storage operators. The price undercutting was due to storage operators buying at perfectly 
competitive prices in the low demand season, and selling at wholesale prices to the marketer in the high 
and peak demand seasons. In the current form of the model, the traders coordinate the injection and 
extraction volumes, and the undercutting of prices in the high and peak demand seasons will not occur. 
Another adjustment relevant for the storage market is that the injection and extraction seasons are not 
specified. Previously the injection and extraction seasons where defined according to seasonal demand 
patterns in the northern hemisphere, which prevented countries in the southern to make use of their 
storage facilities. In the current model, injection and extraction can take place in any demand season, 
dependent on the local circumstances.  
Lastly, the transportation system Operator (TSO) and pipeline operator are integrated, to have a 
consistent modeling approach for both infrastructure services markets (e.g., the storage and pipeline 
markets). Agents which manage and expand the infrastructure, providing services to the traders at a 
regulated service fee. 
2.2 The Current Version of the World Gas Model (WGM-2009) 
 
The current model version is composed of 41 nodes representing individual or aggregated countries and 
covers some 98% of the worldwide consumption and production for 2005. The model operates with five 
year periods from 2005-2030 as well as two seasons (peak and off-peak). On the LNG side, both spot 
markets and a database of contracts are used to add realism. Typical decisions variables that the model 
solves for are operating levels (e.g., production, storage injection) as well as capacity investments (e.g., 
for pipelines, liquefaction). Overall, there are some 45,000 variables that make up the WGM 
complementarity system and it can be solved on a standard personal computer (e.g., 2GB of RAM and 
1.2 GHz clockspeed) in about 50 minutes.  See Figure 4 for details. 
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For the United States, the forecasts presented in the Annual Energy Outlook (April 2009 ARRA version, 
AEO, 2009) were used (www.eia.doe.gov). For Europe, the PRIMES model (European Commission, 2008) 
was used, which provided consumption and production projections for the EU27. For the rest of the 
world, the World Energy Outlook (International Energy Agency, 2008) was used. The WGM was then 
extensively calibrated to match these multiple sources for all countries/aggregated countries and years 
considered (2005, 2010, 2015, 2020, 2025, 2030).10 For the Base Case, the Alaska pipeline is assumed to 
be an option (if feasible) to come online in 2020. Consequently, the Alaska LNG export terminal will be 
phased out in 2015. The resulting WGM output then constitutes the Base Case. 
To understand the capabilities of the WGM, it is instructive to compare it with other large-scale natural 
gas models. The Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution Module is (NGTDM) is one of the modules of 
the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) that is developed and used by the U.S. Department of 
Energy.11 NEMS is a multi-sector model for the United States that includes other fuels than gas. The 
NGTDM is the part that represents the natural gas market. The FRISBEE model (Aune et al., 2009; 
Rosendahl and Sagen, 2009), the Rice World Gas Trade Model (RWGTM) (Rice University, 2004, 2005), 
and the WGM provide much less detail for the North American market. The principal advantage of these 
three models is global coverage, which allows the models to better capture the interaction between 
natural gas markets in different world regions. The WGM also addresses the potential for the 
development of international market power, but it does not allow for the development of supply and 
demand conditions in a detailed bottom-up approach that takes into account changing economic 
conditions. GASMOD (Holz et al., 2008, Holz, 2009) and GASTALE (Lise and Hobbs, 2009) also address 
market power aspects explicitly via the complementarity format, but their coverage is strictly European 
when it comes to demand. Gridnet (www.rbac.com) and ICF’s Gas Market Model (ICF GMM) offer U.S. 
coverage but are designed to support short- to medium-term business decisions. Neither is well suited 
for long-term scenario analysis. See Table 1 for a comparison of these models. 
 
Table 1 Summary of Natural Gas Models 
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NEMS LP USA+CAN No 15b 2030 Yearly 2 5c Endogenous
WGM MCP World Yes 41 2030 Five years 2 3 Endogenous
FRISBEE PE World No 13 2030 Yearly 1 3 Endogenous
                                                            
10 See the Appendix for details on the countries and regions included as well as other relevant geographic or nodal 
information. 
11 www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/overview/nat_gas.html 
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RWGTM CGE World No 460 2050 Five years 1 1 Endogenous
GASMODd MCP Europe+LNG Yes 6 2025 Ten years 1 1 Endogenous
GASTALE MCP Europe+LNG Yes 19 2030 Five years 3 3 Endogenous
GRIDNET LP USA No 18000 operational Monthly 12 N/A Exogenous 
ICF GMM NLP USA No 114 several years Monthly 12 4 Exogenous 
a LP: Linear Programming; MCP: Mixed Complementarity Problem; PE: Partial Equilibrium; CGE: Computable 
General Equilibrium  
b United States 12, Canada 2 and Mexico 1 
c Includes Electric Power Generation, which is not considered as an end-use sector in NEMS. 
d The Dynamic Version of GASMOD 
3. Description of Scenarios  
This section describes the scenarios (cases studies) analyzed as well as hypotheses about how the 
various case assumptions could impact the model outcomes. First, three scenarios are defined in which 
various groups of countries collaborate in a cartel. Second, additional scenarios are included to examine 
the effects of a gas cartel under alternative assumptions about respectively, transport costs and 
unconventional gas. 
The outcomes of the scenarios are compared with the results of the Base Case (described above), for 
the period up to 2030. The Base Case projections in terms of produced and consumed volumes, trade 
flows, prices and profits, for a high and low demand season are not meant as a forecast but rather as a 
reference for comparison. The following table summarizes the Base Case assumptions. 
Table 2 Summary of Base Case Assumptions 
Summary Case Assumptions 
Case 
Consumption 
North 
America 
Production 
North 
America 
Consumption 
Rest of the World 
Production 
Rest of the World 
Alaska 
Pipeline  
AK LNG  
Export 
Terminal 
Base AEO 2009 April ARRA Update 
EC Trends  
IEA WEO 2008 
Option  
2020 
Phase Out 
2015 
 
In the Cartel Cases the member countries collaborate and enforce market power by operating through a 
single trader to jointly optimize cartel profits. Figure 5 (left-hand side) shows how in the Base Case all 
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producing countries have their own trader that maximizes profits. On the right-hand side of this figure a 
cartel situation is depicted, where cartel countries sell through one trader that maximizes aggregate 
profits. In reality cartel members would negotiate the amounts to be produced by all members and it 
might be necessary to redistribute part of the profits to maintain all members in the group. In the 
model, the trader decides on the optimal quantities to sell and on the amounts that each member 
country produces, based on profit maximization. In an ex post fashion, the WGM can compute the share 
of cartel profits for each member but this is not done endogenously. 
For a cartel to be successful, importing countries should not have (affordable) alternative supply 
sources. Therefore, the developments of cost effective resource bases of importing countries are 
important, as are the resources bases of non-cartel member exporting countries. Notably in Australia 
large gas deposits have been found in recent years. Especially in a world market with artificially high 
prices due to cartelization, Australian gas would become more attractive and could provide for an 
alternative supply source to importing countries worldwide. To analyze the impact of developments in 
transport costs (induced by possible technological progress or economies of scale in gas transport) and 
the U.S. shale gas reserves two more sets of scenarios have been defined that provide a comparison 
with the Base and Cartel Cases. In the Low Transport Cost sensitivity cases the investment costs in new 
pipelines and liquefaction and re-gasification capacity are 10% less expensive than in the Base Case, and 
operational costs and regulated fees stay at present levels instead of increasing with an inflationary 
trend of 1.5% per year. The other set of scenarios address lower availability of unconventional gas in the 
United States forming a sort of “worst case” relative to the dramatic unconventional gas increases of 
late. In both these sets of scenarios the influence of a gas cartel is investigated 
The countries in the Gas Exporting Countries Forum as of mid 200912 are the starting point for the Cartel 
Cases (see Figure 16). The Caspian region13 is thought to become a major gas exporter in the coming 
decades (IEA WEO, 2008) but countries in this region have not yet taken part in the GECF. Therefore in a 
second cartel scenario the Caspian region is also defined to be part of the cartel. Many major gas 
exporting countries also have a well-developed oil-export business, and several GECF members are also 
members of OPEC. A notable exception is Saudi Arabia, the leading country in OPEC and a country with 
significant gas reserves, but not a member of the GECF. Although Saudi Arabia is not an exporter of gas, 
and they have a policy of using more natural gas to replace oil domestically and allow more oil exports, 
their significant reserves could allow them to export gas. Other Middle Eastern countries which are 
currently not members of GECF could also decide to take part in a cartel. This is addressed in the third 
Cartel Case with the largest membership base: Besides GECF countries, the Caspian region and the rest 
of the Middle East is included.14 
For the Cartel Cases, it is anticipated that the cartel members will produce lower amounts of natural gas 
to drive up market prices. It is likely that high cost producers within the cartel give up more market 
 
12 Member countries are taken as of mid 2009. The representation of this cartel in the WGM includes the following 
model nodes: North Africa, West Africa, Indonesia, Northern South America, Qatar and Russia. Note that there 
have been some shifts in the membership between mid 2009 and the publication date of this paper. The current 
members (as of mid 2010) were stated in an earlier footnote. 
13 WGM countries: Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Georgia. Model region: Caspian 
14 WGM countries: Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen. Model region: Yemen (= Middle East – non-GECF) 
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share than low cost producers. Non-participating producing countries will reap the benefits from higher 
market prices by increasing their output and export levels. Nevertheless, countries highly dependent on 
gas imports to meet domestic consumption may see severely lower supplies and consequently much 
higher prices. 
Since lower transportation costs make longer distance shipments more attractive it is anticipated that 
the associated scenario will result in a comparative advantage for suppliers further away from the 
importing markets. Since the analysis of cartelization is done for the case with the fewest cartel 
members, LNG exports by the non-GECF part of the Middle East and Australia will likely increase, as 
should long-distance pipeline exports from the Caspian region. For Norway, the increased demand from 
Europe would induce more pipeline exports and lower LNG exports, whereas the increased consumption 
from overseas LNG importers would induce higher LNG exports and lower pipeline imports, making the 
aggregate effect unpredictable.  
Lower U.S. domestic unconventional production rates will result in higher market prices, higher 
production in Alaska, and higher imports from Canadian pipeline gas and LNG from overseas, all things 
being equal. This could potentially make North America more vulnerable to gas cartelization. 
Between 2008 and 2009 EIA significantly increased the production projections for unconventional gas, 
especially for shale gas. In one sensitivity case described in the table below, we analyze how this upward 
revision of domestically produced gas in the U.S . would affect the impacts of a global gas cartel. Since 
the Base Case is calibrated to the – higher - AEO 2009 outlook for unconventional gas in the United 
States, to analyze this question it is necessary to reverse the analysis. In this sensitivity case the 
unconventional gas availability in the model is adjusted downward to match the values of the AEO 2008. 
These adjustments for the years 2010 through 2030 are between 7% and 23%.   
Table 3 Summary of Scenarios Considered 
CASE NAME ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION 
Base Case Base Reference case 
GECF GECF Cartel along the lines of GECF membership 
GECF+Caspian Casp Cartel along the lines of GECF membership plus 
the Caspian Region 
GECF+Caspian 
+Middle East 
Saud Cartel along the lines of GECF membership plus 
the Caspian Region and all of the Middle East 
Base Low  
Transport Costs 
SS10 Base Case with Lower LNG and transport costs 
GECF Low Transport 
Costs 
SS10GECF GECF Case with Lower LNG and transport costs 
Base Low  
Unconventional Case 
Unconv Base Case with Lower availability of 
unconventional gas in USA 
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GECF Low 
Unconventional Case 
UnconvGECF GECF Case with Lower availability of 
unconventional gas in USA 
 
4. Numerical Results  
4.1 Base Case: Results 
The Base Case is the reference for comparison of which the model outcomes have been calibrated to 
closely match the state of the natural gas market in 2005 as well as the projections for the coming 
decades provided by the Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2009), Natural Gas Information (IEA, 2008), 
European Energy and Transport: Trends to 2030 (EC, 2006, 2008) and the World Energy Outlook (IEA, 
2008). Since none of these sources had the desired level of detail, multiple sources were required Due to 
different modeling starting points, and some variations in the three projections, the Base Case results 
differ slightly from each of these sources, however, the results have a similar trend in terms of 
production and consumption growth. A notable point affecting the results is the upwards revision of 
unconventional gas availability in the United States in the Annual Energy Outlook of 2009, resulting in 
much higher North American gas production in the longer term not accounted for in other projections. 
Naturally the higher North American gas production and lower imports affect LNG trade, regional trade 
balances, production and consumption globally. 
As noted above, for the United States, the WGM was calibrated to the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 
2009 figures (April 2009 ARRA version).  Note that the WGM output is net production as opposed to 
gross production in the AEO 2009-ARRA data.15 Table 4 indicates that on the whole, the percentage 
difference between the AEO and WGM figures is fairly low. The downward deviation in production is 
due to inconsistency in projections of calibration references for other parts of the World (IEA, 2008) with 
AEO 2009, while the upward deviation is due to the Alaska pipeline coming on stream earlier in our 
model than in the AEO. 
 
Table 4 World Gas Model Base Case, U.S. Production and Consumption in Billion Cubic  Meters. Difference 
Between World Gas Model Base Case and AEO 2009 in parentheses 
Base Case 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Production 513.7 
(-3.70%)
508.1 
(-0.31%)
544.6 
(4.21%)
588.2 
(0.59%)
619.4 
(0.81%) 
                                                            
15 In the supply chain that brings gas from the production wells to the end-users, there are several steps that 
induce losses. The main difference between net and gross production is due to processing losses such as lease and 
plant fuel. From the consumption figures, also pipeline fuel must be subtracted, since these losses are accounted 
for in pipeline transportation. The WGM explicitly accounts for losses in liquefaction, LNG shipment, regasification, 
pipeline and storage losses, but AEO reports aggregate losses only. There are also usage categories, such as own 
use in the energy sector for enhanced oil recovery, that are not represented in the WGM. Production capacities 
and volumes in the WGM are net production volumes, i.e., volumes destined to a number of consumption sectors.  
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Consumption 575.8 
(1.50%) 
556.8 
(1.94%) 
572.1 
(2.37%)
607.2 
(1.11%)
614.0 
(1.20%) 
 
WEO (IEA, 2008) reports projections for two future years: 2015 and 2030. In WEO, values are not 
available for all countries, but for continental regions and some major gas consuming and producing 
countries only. Global production and consumption in 2015 are forecasted to be 3,512 bcm, and 4,434 
bcm in 2030.Similarly as the AEO projections for the United States, the WEO presents gross values. To 
account for different maturity levels of domestic markets assumptions for how to divide regional 
projections to individual countries were made. In the WEO, the growth percentages for global 
production in the period 2005-2015, and 2005-2030 are about 21.8% and 53.8%; for consumption these 
values are 23.2% and 55.6% respectively. 16  In the WGM, the growth percentages in these periods are 
19.0% respectively, 53.3% for production; and 18.9% resp 53.5% for consumption.   
With respect to price projections a choice needed to be made. In AEO 2009 the gas prices vary 
somewhat over time, but stay relatively stable. In WEO prices quadruple in roughly 4½ decades with a 
yearly average increase of 3.1%. We have assumed a yearly increase in costs and consumer’s willingness 
to pay of 1.5% to let prices increase gradually over the next decades. 
In terms of price outcomes, Figure 6 shows that in 2030, the Base Case has dramatic price differences by 
region with Europe the highest at $10.13 per million BTU (MMBtu) due presumably to its diminishing 
domestic production, and the supply regions (Africa, Caspian, Mideast, Russia) the lowest in the range of 
$2.50-$3.50. The N. America, S. America, and Asia-Pacific make up the middle range of prices between 
$7-$8. 
In terms of world trade flows of natural gas, from Figure 7 the trend is clear. Europe is the largest 
importer of gas (pipeline and LNG) and the Asia/Pacific region is the next highest with both North and 
South America negligible. On the other hand, Africa, the Caspian, the Mid-East, and Russia are major 
exporters of gas. 
4.2 Cartel Cases: Results 
In this section, the hypothesis that a cartel, if created could significantly raise prices and curtail 
production is examined. Each of the possible cartels considered is compared against the Base Case as 
well as against each other to gauge the magnitude of potential cartel-induced effects. The first cartel 
considered is the current configuration of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) described above.   
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show that that the price effects of the cartel vary greatly by region for 2020 and 
2030. Europe sees the biggest price increase between the Base and GECF Case with about $1/MMBTU in 
2020 and about $1.50/MMBTU in 2030. This makes sense since this region has depleting resources of its 
own and a strong dependence on cartel members (e.g., Russia), so it would face the brunt of such a 
cartel’s effect. After Europe, the Asia-Pacific region and the Caspian have the next largest price increase 
at around $0.30-$0.40 in 2020 and $0.50-$0.80 in 2030. Asia (in particular Japan and South Korea) is 
heavily dependent on LNG imports. This also implies that they have more flexibility in choosing their 
suppliers, and so they are able to mitigate to some extent the effects of a cartel. Hence, the effect of 
                                                            
16 Own calculations based on WEO data.  
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cartel formation has less effect on the Asian nations. Countries that have their gas supply through 
permanent pipelines face more dramatic effect since they do not have as much options as those which 
import LNG. An additional reason for only moderate price increases on average in the Asian region is 
that some of the Asian countries are GECF members, and GECF member countries will typically see 
lower domestic prices as the marginal costs of domestic supply in GECF countries fall as exports are 
curtailed. The Caspian region, which in particular includes Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, 
face increased prices in case of cartel formation. An explanation is that this region starts exporting more 
gas, especially to Europe, and thus less is available for domestic markets without higher prices.  
The Mid-East and North America see relatively small price increases in 2020 and 2030. For North 
America this is due presumably to their low level of initial gas trade combined with long distance to 
most GECF countries, which insulate this continent from the effects of the cartel. The Mid-East region in 
the model includes Iran and Qatar, which are members of the cartel, and Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen, which are not. Thus, some of the Mid-East countries will see lower 
prices and some will see higher prices when the cartel is formed, which explains the small overall price 
effect in this region.   Domestic gas prices in Russia and Africa decrease as a result of cartel formation. 
The explanation is that both Russia and the biggest gas producers in Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and 
Nigeria) are GECF members, and so more gas is available for domestic consumption when exports are 
curtailed. In particular, Africa cuts back a significant share of their export (see below), which moreover 
constitutes a large share of their initial production, in the GECF case, and thus prices fall by almost 20% 
in 2020. South America sees a small price decrease in 2020 but a price increase of $0.74 in 2030. Again, 
this is due to some countries being GECF members (Bolivia and Venezuela), and others not (e.g., 
Trinidad and Tobago). In 2020, the price decreases in GECF countries dominate the price increases in 
non-members, whereas in 2030 the opposite is the case. 
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show that  again Europe experiences the biggest effects of the GECF cartel with 
an almost 50 BCM (6.6% of Base Case levels) drop in consumption due to higher prices in 2020, and an 
approximate 60 BCM decrease (8.1%) in 2030. Less consumption in the range of 3-5% are felt also by 
Asia-Pacific, the Mid-East and the Caspian in 2020, with this range changing to 4-9% in 2030. The biggest 
reduction is in the Caspian region, which is located in between the three most important GECF members 
(Russia, Qatar and Iran). The Caspian region faces a 5.29% reduction in 2020 and 8.6% in 2030. North 
America witnesses almost no change in consumption due to its semi-isolation from the cartel. South 
America also has a negligible drop in consumption in 2020 (0.3%) but which is increased to almost 4% in 
2030 due to the price increase mentioned above. Russian consumers are the big winners under the 
GECF Cartel case by increasing their consumption substantially (6% in 2020 and almost 10% in 2030).  
GECF cartel countries reduce their production by 2.55% in total compared to the Base Case level. The 
regions that have substantial cutbacks in production are Africa, Russia, and South America, which all 
include cartel members (see Figure 17 and Figure 18).  The curtailments in production for these supply 
regions range from about 4% (South America, 2030) all the way up to about 23% (Africa, 2030). To 
compensate for the decrease in production from the GECF cartel, there are three regions that 
substantially increase their own production in 2020 and 2030: The Caspian, Europe, and the Mid-East. 
Again, a similar pattern holds for North America, namely that there is not much change between the 
Base and GECF Cartel case in terms of production.  
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As a consequence of reduced exports from GECF members, inter-regional gas trade is reduced by 13% in 
2020 (16% in 2030), see Figure 13. In particular, imports to Europe decrease by 15% (65 BCM) compared 
to the Base Case, whereas imports to North America and Asia-Pacific are hardly reduced at all. For North 
America, this is in line with previous explanations above. The Asia-Pacific region has two GECF members 
in the WGM (Indonesia and Malaysia, which have recently withdrawn, however). Thus, non-members in 
this region will see reduced imports even though the region as a whole has an almost unchanged trade 
balance. In 2030 the impacts of the GECF cartel on trade are very similar to the 2020 picture, except for 
Asia-Pacific which then imports 23% less than in the Base Case, which is due to reduced importance of 
Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The GECF as a group benefits from cartelization in 2020, as the member countries’ joint profits increase 
by 5%. However, there are substantial differences between countries, cf. Figure 14. First, note that 
Russia’s profits go down when GECF acts as a cartel. Thus, without transfers of revenues between 
member countries, this outcome seems unlikely. North Africa also gets lower profits in the GECF cartel 
case, whereas other member countries benefit. Consider for instance the profits in Qatar/Iran which 
almost double. The explanation is that both Russia and North Africa cut back substantially on their 
exports (more than one third), whereas supply cuts in other member countries are more moderate.  This 
decreased profitability would thus be a disincentive for Cartel members such as Russia to join GECF.  
In 2030 the GECF as a group no longer benefits from cartelization. In fact, joint profits are reduced by 
3%. African regions are particularly worse off in 2030 without transfers of revenues; see Figure 15. The 
decrease in joint profits is at least partly due to higher investments in transport capacity in non-member 
countries in the preceding years, which makes it more difficult for GECF to gain any cartel profits in the 
long run. For instance, the Caspian region invests 20% more in pipeline capacity up to 2030 in the GECF 
Cartel Case than in the Base Case, whereas Mid-East producers outside GECF expand their LNG 
liquefaction capacity much more rapidly.17 On the other hand, in the short run there are significant 
profits to gain from cartelization: Profits in 2010 are 15% higher for GECF as a group compared to the 
Base Case. Thus, discounted profits over the time horizon considered are higher for the GECF members 
in the GECF Cartel Case than in the Base Case,18and this discounted stream of profits is what the WGM 
uses.  Nevertheless, despite significant initial profits, the overall gains from cartelization seem small and 
probably too small to overcome the hidden costs of cartelization that are not included in our study (e.g., 
political costs, agreeing on issues like revenue transfers, etc.). 
Table 5. Total profit in cartel member countries. Billion $ 
 
17 Russian investments in pipeline capacity and African investments in liquefaction capacity are substantially 
reduced in the GECF Cartel Case. 
18 Note that, with Cournot competition, a merging between two or more Cournot players does not necessarily lead 
to higher joint profits for these players, and the merging leads to increased supply from other producers. The 
opposite, i.e., a split-up of a Cournot player into two Cournot players, is for example analyzed in the context of the 
Russian gas market in (Tsygankova, 2010). 
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Year CASE GECF GECF+Caspian 
GECF+Caspian
+Middle East 
BASE CASE $33.619 $39.752 $47.883 
2010 
DIFFERENCE IN 
CARTEL CASE 
$5.050 
(+15%) 
$11.798 
(+30%) 
$20.269 
(+42%) 
BASE CASE $56.579 $70.394 $88.346 
2020 DIFFERENCE IN 
CARTEL CASE 
$2.793 
(+5%) 
$12.320 
(+18%) 
$37.603 
(+43%) 
BASE CASE $88.675 $110.457 $130.882 
2030 DIFFERENCE IN 
CARTEL CASE 
-$2.559 
(-3%) 
$13.403 
(+12%) 
$42.127 
(+32%) 
 
Not surprisingly, non-GECF producers such as the Caspian region, Norway and in particular the Mid-East 
gain from the cartelization of GECF. Profits in the Mid-East region are in fact tripled, although from a 
rather low level.  
Two other variations on the GECF Cartel are next considered: adding the Caspian region to the cartel 
(particularly Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan), and adding the Caspian region as well 
as the whole Mid-East (not just Iran and Qatar). Ex ante, as more cartel members are added, one should 
see more dramatic results (i.e., higher prices for consumers, less production by cartel members). Figure 
12 shows the evolution of prices in Europe over time for 2020 and 2030 under each of these cartel 
scenarios. The price effects are substantial and indeed increasing as more cartel members are brought 
in. In 2020, the Base Case price is $8.39 (per million BTU), and this rises to $9.45 with the GECF Cartel, 
$10.50 when the Caspian region is brought in, and finally $11.11 when the whole Mid-East region is also 
part of the cartel. This amounts to $2.72 of a price premium to the cartel or $63.8 billion in lost 
consumer surplus for Europe due to the formation of this most extreme cartel. A similar pattern exists 
for 2030 for Europe with an even more extreme premium of $3.69 or $91.4 billion in lost consumer 
surplus. This is alarming news for Europe and signals that this region may want to be sure about its 
supply diversity options to protect its economy.19   
                                                            
19 Norway, currently being an observer to GECF, is an important supplier for the European region, accounting for 
20% of total European gas consumption. If Norway should choose to participate in a gas cartel, e.g., adding Norway 
to the standard GECF cartel, gas prices in Europe would increase substantially although less than if the entire 
Caspian and Mid-East regions were included. In 2020, the price premium under the GECF-Norway case amounts to 
$1.95 ($2.24 in 2030), attesting to the strategic importance of this country as gas supplier to Europe. 
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Consistent with higher prices, consumption of gas is reduced even more when more countries join the 
cartel. European consumption of gas is reduced by up to 17% in 2020 and 21% in 2030 when the cartel 
consists of both the Caspian and the Mid-East region. In the Asia-Pacific region, the relative 
consumption reduction is about half as big as in Europe. Consumers in North and South America on the 
other hand are still shielded from the effects of the cartel. 
When the Caspian region joins the cartel, Figure 13 indicates that gas supply from this region is 
dramatically reduced in 2020 (and 2030, more than one third in 2020 compared to the GECF Cartel 
Case). Some of the initial members now increase their supply somewhat (Russia and Africa), whereas 
others decrease output even more (Qatar/Iran). This reflects that expanding the cartel has two opposing 
effects on optimal output from incumbent members. On the one hand, reduced output from the new 
member improves the profitability of increasing production from other Cournot players, including the 
cartel. On the other hand, extending the cartel implies that higher prices due to reduced supply benefit 
more countries within the cartel. 
When all Middle Eastern countries are part of the cartel, total Mid-East production is reduced by almost 
10% compared to the Caspian Cartel Case. In this case the other cartel members slightly increase their 
output. Global gas production reaches 5% below Base Case production in both 2020 and 2030. 
The impacts on trade follow the consumption and production effects discussed above (see Figure 13 for 
2020). Imports to Europe are reduced by 36% (33%) in 2020 (2030) when both Caspian and all Mid-East 
countries are members of the cartel (compared to no cartel). Even more dramatic, Caspian exports in 
2020 are reduced by more than 70% when this region joins the cartel (i.e., vs. GECF Cartel Case), and 
slightly less in 2030 (60% reduction). Further, exports from the Middle East are reduced by 45% (60%) in 
2020 (2030) when this entire region is part of the cartel (i.e., compared to the Base Case). 
The relative gains from cartelization, i.e., the joint profits of all cartel members divided by the joint 
profits of these countries in the Base Case, are increased when the cartel is expanded. The countries in 
the GECF+Caspian cartel have jointly 18% (12%) higher profits in 2020 (2030) than in the Base Case, 
whereas the countries in the GECF+Caspian+Mid-East cartel have jointly 35% (34%) higher profits in 
2020 (2030) than in the Base Case. These numbers are significantly bigger than the cartelization gains 
with only the GECF members. Thus, the results may suggest that if not only current GECF members but 
also other Middle Eastern countries as well as Caspian countries are ready to form a gas cartel, the 
benefits from cartelization could be substantial, and possibly large enough to overcome the hurdles 
discussed before. 
When considering the profits of individual cartel members, Figure 14 shows that all members except the 
Caspian region (“Kazakhstan”) benefit from cartelization in one or both of the two extended cartel cases 
in 2020. In 2030, however, other members also stand to lose (relative to the Base Case). On the other 
hand, Russia now gains significantly from being part of the cartel, as opposed to in the GECF Cartel Case 
when for example, the Caspian region is not part of the cartel. The explanation is presumably a 
combination of less reduction in Russian output when more countries join the cartel, and higher export 
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prices as new member countries (especially neighboring countries in the Caspian region) decrease 
instead of increase their output (see Figure 8 and Figure 17 for 2020). Figure 14 and Figure 15 also show 
that both the Caspian region and the non-GECF Middle Eastern countries (“Yemen”) are much better off 
as free-riders outside a cartel than as cartel members. This is not surprising – gas exporting countries 
outside the cartel will benefit from higher prices without having to reduce export volumes. These 
aspects obviously influence the likelihood of establishing an effective gas cartel. 
4.3 Other Sensitivity Cases: Results 
In this subsection the importance of unconventional gas in the United States, and gas transport costs, 
respectively, are explored. That is, would the effects from cartelization have been bigger without the 
recent increase in shale gas and other unconventional gas reserves in the United States? And, how will 
the profits of cartelization change if costs of gas transport are reduced? Only the GECF Cartel Case is 
considered in these sensitivity analyses, and then compared to the revised cartel cases with revised base 
cases. 
The increased estimates of unconventional gas reserves in the United States have implied that projected 
imports of gas to the United States are substantially lower than a few years back, and the results above 
have shown that gas cartelization has negligible impacts on the North American gas market. Thus, it is 
reasonable to presume that without this increase in gas reserves, a gas cartel would be more able to 
make additional profits in this market.  
As expected, the model simulations suggest that with less unconventional gas reserves in the United 
States, gas prices in North America go up and consumption goes down, both in the revised Base Case 
and in the revised Cartel Case (see Figure 19, Figure 22). Prices and consumption in other regions of the 
world are hardly affected at all. Furthermore, the effects of cartelization on prices and consumption in 
North America are still small, but not as negligible as before.  
Gas production in North America obviously falls both with and without a gas cartel when unconventional 
reserves are reduced, but the impacts of cartelization are about the same as it was without this 
reduction in reserves. Production in other regions is more or less the same as before, whereas imports 
into the United States are slightly increased. Further, the effects of cartelization on U.S. imports are 
somewhat bigger than without reduction in U.S. gas reserves, which is consistent with the slightly bigger 
price effect.  
Although the U.S. market would have been slightly more affected by cartelization if unconventional gas 
reserves were lower, the gains from cartelization are not changed. Thus, we may conclude that the 
recent uptick in U.S. gas reserves has not affected the likelihood of cartelization in international gas 
markets.  
Lower transport costs make it easier (i.e., cheaper) for gas producers to export their gas to markets 
farther away, and thus exploit their market power in more markets overall. This is important as the 
biggest gas reserve countries (and GECF members) are located quite close to each other, and far from 
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regions such as the Americas. On the other hand, lower transport costs can make it more difficult to 
exploit market power in closer areas, as gas consumers can more easily import gas from alternative gas 
suppliers.  Reduced costs of transport in the gas market generally lead to lower prices and increased 
consumption in importing regions.20 On the other hand, prices in export regions will tend to go up as 
more gas is exported and marginal costs of domestic production increase. This pattern is seen for 
example in Table 12, Table 13, Table 14, Table 15 although the figures are small The price and 
consumption effects of cartelization, however, are more or less the same as before, although slightly 
bigger for some regions (e.g., 14% instead of 13% price increase in Europe in 2020).  
Production of gas is higher in most regions in the revised Base Case, i.e., with lower transport costs. The 
exception is Europe, where domestic producers are outperformed by cheaper imports. Again, the 
impacts of cartelization are not very different from the previous results, although regions like Africa and 
Europe see somewhat bigger reductions and expansions, respectively, in their production. Not 
surprisingly, overall trade is higher with lower transport costs, and we also find that the cartelization 
brings about a slightly larger cutback in trade than in the original GECF Cartel Case. 
Consistent with slightly bigger impacts on prices and quantities, the GECF as a group profits somewhat 
more from cartelization when transport costs are reduced. Their joint profits now increase by 8% in 
2020 vs. 5% in the original GECF Cartel Case. In 2030 the change in profits is more or less the same as 
before, however. Thus, we might conclude that a more integrated gas market following reductions in 
gas transportation costs will increase the profits and thus the likelihood of gas cartelization, although 
not substantially. Furthermore, a combination of lower transport costs and more members of GECF 
could definitely increase the effectiveness of coordinated supply cuts, with GECF becoming closer to a 
“gas-OPEC”. 
5. Conclusions & Future Work  
Natural gas is increasingly a fuel of choice in power generation as well as other sectors and securing 
reliable supplies are important for many countries especially in regions rely heavily on imports e.g., 
Europe.  In this paper, using the World Gas Model, the effects of a gas cartel along the lines of the Gas 
Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) have been analyzed.  Besides the basic GECF member countries, 
additional ones have also been added to see the supplemental influence on regional prices, 
consumption, and production.  In addition, lower transport costs and less U.S. shale gas being available 
were also analyzed.  All the scenarios considered have strong policy implications when one takes into 
account supply security, environmental considerations and impact from a potential gas cartel. 
In the most extreme scenario where GECF, the Caspian, and the Middle Eastern countries all form a 
cartel, the effects are dramatic.  For example, in 2030, as compared to a Base Case, Europe sees an 
increase of $3.69 per million BTU or $91.4 billion in lost consumer surplus due to the effects of this 
supra-GECF cartel.  Consequently European consumption of gas drops by about 21% which would be a 
 
20 As shown in Rosendahl and Sagen (2009), prices can in fact increase in some import regions if the exporting 
region finds it profitable to increase exports to more distant markets. 
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dramatic change.  By contrast, North America sees almost no change in prices, consumption, nor 
production being isolated to some extent.   
By contrast, when the unconventional gas resource base in the United States is diminished, North 
America faces some changes in gas prices and consumption but the rest of the world is hardly affected.  
Lastly, lower transportation costs don’t dramatically change prices in most regions except for Europe 
which sees lower values with or without the presence of the GECF cartel. 
Future work on gas markets could include better characterizations of the shale gas basins in the United 
States and elsewhere and their effects on increasing global supply and reducing prices.  A natural 
question is whether or not the large U.S. shale gas resource if exported to other parts of the world 
would be enough to offset effects of a potential cartel. 
 
6. References 
AEO, 2009, “Annual Energy Outlook”, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/,  
F.R. Aune, K.E. Rosendahl, E.L. Sagen, 2009,  “Globalisation of natural gas markets – effects on prices and 
trade patterns, Special Issue of The Energy Journal Vol. 30, April 2009, 39-54. 
D.L. Brito and P.R. Hartley, 2007, "Expectations and the Evolving World Gas Market", The Energy Journal 
28 (1),1-24. 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2008, www.bp.com.  
D. Cohen, “A Shale Gas Boom?”, 2009, Energy Bulletin, June 25 
,http://www.energybulletin.net/node/49342. 
The Economist, 2008, “Liquefied Natural Gas a More Liquid Market, “October 4. 
The Economist, 2009, “Pipe Down,” January 10, 44-45.“War-War, Not Jaw-Jaw,” January 17, ,  52-53; 
“Gasping for Gas,” January 17, , 53. 
R. Egging, S. A. Gabriel, 2006, "Examining Market Power in the European Natural Gas Market", Energy 
Policy, 34 (17), 2762-2778, . 
R. Egging, S.A. Gabriel, F.Holz, J. Zhuang, 2008a, "A Complementarity Model for the European Natural 
Gas Market," Energy Policy, January, Volume 36, Issue 7, Pages 2385-2414. 
R. Egging, F. Holz, C. Von Hirschhausen and S. A. Gabriel, 2009, “Representing GASPEC with the World 
Gas Model,” Special Issue of The Energy Journal Vol. 30, 97-117. 
R. Egging, F. Holz and S.A. Gabriel, 2010, “The World Gas Model,” Accepted for publication by Energy, 
2010, doi:10.1016/j.energy.2010.03.053 
20 
 
R. Egging, S. Gabriel, F. Holz, D. Huppmann, C. von Hirschhausen, S. Rüster, 2008b, "Clean or Dirty 
Natural Gas? - Natural Gas Demand Scenarios and Infrastructure Investments up to 2030", Presented at 
2nd Transatlantic Infraday,Washington D.C. , November 14. 
Energy Business Review, 2005, “GECF unlikely to emerge as OPEC equivalent”,  
http://www.energy-business-review.com/article_feature.asp?guid=BE742459-2CC6-42FF-BD70-
8CAA2CE74827, July 1. 
EIA, 2008, Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, eia.doe.gov. 
EIA, 2009, Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, eia.doe.gov. 
EMF (Energy Modeling Forum)., 2007,  “Prices and Trade in a Globalizing Natural Gas Market”. Working 
Group 23 Summary Report, Stanford University Stanford, CA. 
European Commission, 2008, European energy and transport : trends to 2030, update 2007, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publ. of the Europ. Communities. 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030_update_2007/energy_transport_trend
s_2030_update_2007_en.pdfFacchinei, F., J.-S.Pang, 2003, Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities 
and Complementarity Problems. Springer, New York. 
D. Finon, 2007, “Russia and the ‘Gas-OPEC’. Real or Perceived Threat”, IFRI Russia/NIS Center, 
Russie.NE.Visions, #24, November. 
D. Finon and C. Locatelli, 2008, “Russian and European Gas Interdependence: Could Contractual Trade 
Channel Geopolitics?”, Energy Policy 38,423-442. 
Fort Worth BusinessPress, 2008, “Natural Gas Troika Could Have Impact on Shale Plays,” January 19, . 
Fowler, T. 2009, The Houston Chronicle, 
http://blogs.chron.com/newswatchenergy/archives/2009/12/would_frac_act.html 
GECF Forum, www.gecforum.com , accessed  June 2, 2010.  
S. A. Gabriel, S. Kiet, J. Zhuang, 2005a, "A Mixed Complementarity-Based Equilibrium Model of Natural 
Gas Markets", Operations Research, 53(5),799-818. 
S. A. Gabriel, J. Zhuang, S. Kiet,2005b,  "A Large-Scale Complementarity Model of the North American 
Natural Gas Market", Energy Economics, 27, 639-665. 
R. Golombek, E. Gjelsvik and K.E. Rosendahl, 1995, “Effects of Liberalizing the Natural Gas Market in 
Western Europe”, The Energy Journal 16 (1), 85-111. 
R. Golombek, E. Gjelsvik and K.E. Rosendahl, 1998, “Increased Competition on the Supply Side of the 
Western European Natural Gas Market”, The Energy Journal 19 (3), 1-18. 
Hallouche H., 2006, ”The Gas Exporting Countries Forum: Is it really a Gas OPEC in the Making,” Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, NG 13, Oxford. 
21 
 
Franziska Holz, Christian von Hirschhausen, Claudia Kemfert, 2008,  “A Strategic Model of European Gas 
Supply (GASMOD),” Energy Economics 30, 766–788. 
Franziska Holz,  2009  Modeling the European Natural Gas Market - Static and Dynamic Perspectives of 
an Oligopolistic Market, Dissertation, January 8. 
H. Huntington (ed.), 2009, World Natural Gas Markets and Trade: A Multi-Modeling Perspective. Special 
Issue of The Energy Journal. 
International Energy Agency, 2008, “World Energy Outlook 2008”. 
ICF, 2009, ICF’S GAS MARKET MODEL OVERVIEW, personal communication.  
A.M. Jaffe, R. Soligo , 2006, “Market Structure in the New Gas Economy: Is Cartelization Possible?”  In 
Victor, D.G., Jaffe, A.M., Hayes, M. H. (Eds), Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From 1970 to 2040, chapter 11, 
Cambridge University Press. 
J. T. Jensen, 2004, “The Development of a Global LNG Market. Is it Likely? If so When?” Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies. 
V. Kalashnikov and N. Kalashnykova 2008, "A strategic model of European gas supply", International 
Business & Economics Research Journal, 7(5), 43-50.  
W. Lise and B.F. Hobbs, 2009, “A Dynamic Simulation of Market Power in the Liberalised European 
Natural Gas Market,” Energy Journal (30).119 – 136. 
National Petroleum Council, 2007, “Hard Truths Facing the Hard Truths About Energy,” 
http://www.npchardtruthsreport.org/, July. 
National Public Radio, 2009a, “Water Contamination Concerns Linger for Shale Gas,” Tom Gjelten, 
September 23, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113142234&ps=rs.   
National Public Radio, 2009b, “NPR Uncovers Natural Gas’s Dirty Secrets,” Elaine Shannon, November 5, 
http://www.enviroblog.org/2009/11/npr-uncovers-natural-gass-dirty-secrets.html 
New York Times, 2006, "Gas Halt May Produce Big Ripples in European Policy," January 3; " Gazprom 
Builds Wealth for Itself, but Anxiety for Others," January 13. 
O. Skagen, 2010, “Global gas reserves and resources: Trends, discontinuities and uncertainties,” 
SSB/NAE Workshop, January 18, Oslo, Norway. 
Potential Gas Committee, 2010, http://www.mines.edu/Potential-Gas-Committee-reports-
unprecedented-increase-in-magnitude-of-U.S.-natural-gas-resource-base 
Propublica, 2009, http://www.propublica.org/feature/frac-act-congress-introduces-bills-to-control-
drilling-609 
Rice, 2004, www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/GSP_WorldGasTradeModel_Part1_05_26_04.pdf 
Rice, 2005, http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/GAS_BIWGTM_March2005.pdf 
K.E. Rosendahl E.L. Sagen, 2009, The Global Natural Gas Market. Will transport cost reductions lead to 
lower prices? The Energy Journal 30 (2), 17-40. 
L. Steffy, 2009, “Shale or Sham?”, Houston Chronicle, November 12, 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/steffy/6717948.html 
M. Tsygankova, 2010,  “When is a break-up of Gazprom good for Russia?” Energy Economics 32, 908-
917.  
O.N. Wagbara 2007, “How would the gas exporting countries forum influence gas trade?” Energy Policy 
35(2), 1224-1237. 
WGI (World Gas Intelligence), 2010, “GECF Falls Short of Spot Sales Deal, “ April 21.. 
7. Appendix 
This Appendix presents the optimization problems and market-clearing conditions that constitute the 
World Gas Model. The modeled market agents include producers (P), traders (T), liquefiers (L), LNG 
shipment, regasifiers (R), transmission system operator, storage operators (S), marketers (M) and 
several consumption sectors (K1, K2, K3).  
Producers sell gas to their trading arms. Traders ship gas to consumer markets, domestically via 
distribution networks, or internationally via high pressure pipeline networks or LNG terminals, ships and 
regasifiers in other countries. Traders make use of storage services to balance their flows among 
seasons.  
Nomenclature 
This subsection lists the symbols used.  
 
Sets 
a A∈   Gas transportation arcs, e.g., {NNED_GER, LNOR_FRA, RGER_GER}21 
                                                            
21 The first letter indicates the type of arc, combinations of three letters denote the region of country name. 
NNED_GER represents a pipeline from the Netherlands to Germany; LNOR_FRA an LNG shipping arc from the 
Norwegian liquefaction node to the regasification node of France and RGER_GER the arc from the German 
regasification node to the German country node. NNIG_LNG would denote the arc from the country node Nigeria 
to the Nigerian liquefaction node. 
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d D∈   Demand seasons, e.g., {low, high} 
p P∈   Producers, e.g., {P_NOR, P_RUW, P_RUE } 
m M∈  Years, e.g., {2005, 2010, 2015, 2020} 
n N∈   Model nodes22, e.g., {N_NOR, N_RUW} 
s S∈   Storage facilities, e.g., {S_NED, S_GER} 
t T∈   Traders, e.g., {T_NOR, T_RUS} 
( )a n+   Inward arcs 
( )a n−   Outward arcs 
For subsets of nodes where a player x is present, we use N(x). To refer to individual nodes in this set, we 
write n(x). Similarly, to denote the subset of agents X present at node n, we use: X(n), (e.g. T(n) are the 
traders with access to node n); and to refer to individual set elements of this set, we write x(n). 
 
The set elements are used as subscripts and super scripts in the other symbols. 
 
Input parameters 
A
amb   Arc capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm/d) 
SI
smb   Storage injection capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 
                                                            
22 Model nodes represent geographical regions in the world. They can be defined flexibly in the model data set. 
Due to the limited relevance and impact of countries that only produce and consume small amounts, several 
countries have been grouped with neighboring ones and are represented in the model data set on an aggregate 
level. For some countries the opposite is true: their consumption or production is so high, and the geographical 
distances so large, that a division of the countries in several regions is warranted.  
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SX
smb   Storage extraction capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 
SW
smb   Storage working gas capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 
(.)Ppmc   Production costs (k$/mcm) 
A
amCAP  Arc capacity (mcm/d)23 
SI
smCAP   Storage injection capacity (mcm/d)23 
SX
smCAP  Storage extraction capacity (mcm/d) 23 
T
tadmCON  Contractual supply obligation (mcm/d)
 23 
C
tnδ   Level of market power exerted by trader in a market, [ ]0,1Ctnδ ∈ ; 
  0 is perfectly competitive, 1 is fully Cournot. 
ddays   Number of days in season, e.g., dayslow=183 
A
amΔ   Upper bound of arc capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SI
smΔ   Upper bound of storage injection capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SX
smΔ   Upper bound of storage extraction capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SW
smΔ   Upper bound of storage working gas capacity expansion (mcm) 
mγ   Discount rate in year,  ( ]0,1mγ ∈
W
ndmINT   Intercept of inverse demand curve (mcm/d) 
aloss   Loss rate of gas in transport arc, [ )0,1al ∈  
                                                            
23 Subscript m is to account for the year for expansions approved or under construction. 
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sloss    Loss rate of gas storage injection, [ )0,1sl ∈  
P
pmPR   Daily production capacity (mcm/d) 
P
pPH   Total producible reserves in time horizon (mcm) 
W
ndmSLP   Slope of inverse demand curve (mcm/d/k$) 
,A reg
admτ   Regulated fee for arc usage (k$/mcm) 
,SI reg
sdmτ   Regulated fee for storage injection (k$/mcm) 
S
smWG   Storage working gas capacity (mcm/d) 23 
 
Variables (all variables are taken to be nonnegative) 
A
amΔ   Arc capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SI
snmΔ   Storage injection capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SX
snmΔ   Storage extraction capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SW
snmΔ   Storage working gas capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
T
tadmFLOW  Arc flow by trader (mcm/d) 
T
tndmINJ  Quantity injected to storage by trader (mcm/d) 
T
tndmPURCH  Quantity bought from producer by trader (mcm/d) 
A
admSALES  Pipeline capacity assigned to trader (mcm/d) 
P
pdmSALES  Quantity sold by producer to traders (mcm/d) 
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SI
sdmSALES  Storage injection capacity assigned for use to traders (mcm/d)  
SX
sdmSALES  Storage extraction capacity assigned for use to traders (mcm/d) 
T
tndmSALES  Quantity sold to end-user markets by trader (mcm/d) 
T
tndmXTR  Quantity extracted from storage by trader (mcm/d) 
 
When presenting restrictions in the formulations below, Greek symbols in parentheses represent the 
dual variables used in the KKT derivation. 
Dual variables 
, 0α β ≥  dual variables to capacity restrictions 
freeϕ   dual variables to mass balance constraints 
0ρ ≥   dual variables to capacity expansion limitations 
freeπ   duals to market-clearing conditions for sold and bought quantities 
freeτ   duals market-clearing conditions for capacity assignment and usage. 
 
In what follows, we describe the representation of the producer and other players. 
Producer Problem 
A producer p is modeled as maximizing his discounted profits, which are the result of revenues from 
sales PpdmSALES minus production costs. Cash flows in year m are discounted with a factor mγ . Since 
sales-rates are per day and may differ by season, the sales-rates and production costs are multiplied by 
the number of days in the season:  . ddays
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P
( )max ( )P
pdm
P P P
m d n p dm pdm pm pdm
SALES m M d D
days SALES c SALESγ π
∈ ∈
 −    (A.1) 
The sales-rate is restricted by a production capacity 
P
pmPR  (that can vary by year):  
 ( ). . ,PP Ppmpdm pdms t SALES PR d m α≤ ∀ R  (A.2) 
Due to reserve limitations or governmental restrictions the aggregate production over all years in a time 
period is restricted by a production ceiling pPH . 
 ( )P Ppd pdm p
m M d D
days SALES PH m α
∈ ∈
≤ ∀  H  (A.3) 
Lastly, the sales-rate must be nonnegative: 
 0 ,PpdmSALES d m≥ ∀  (A.4) 
The KKT conditions for the producer and all other agents can be found at the end of this Appendix. The 
market player described in the following sub-section is the trader. 
Trader Problem  
The trader maximizes profits resulting from selling gas to marketers ( ), net of the gas 
purchasing costs and the costs: a regulated fee 
T
tndmSALES
A,reg
admτ  plus a congestion fee 
A
admτ , to transport the gas 
( ) over high pressure pipelines a. The parameter TtadmFLOW [ ]0,1Ctnδ ∈  indicates the level of market 
power exerted by a trader at a consumption node, with 0 representing perfect competitive behavior and 
1 representing perfect Nash-Cournot oligopolistic behavior. Values between 0 and 1 indicate that we 
assume that some market power is exerted by the trader, but diluted relative to Cournot competition. 
The expression  can be viewed as a weighted average of market prices 
resulting from the inverse demand function  and a perfectly competitive market-clearing 
wholesale price . The trader also decides how much gas to inject in and extract from storage. The 
costs for injection are a regulated fee and a congestion rate; costs for extraction are a congestion rate 
only. Thus, trader t is modeled as solving the following optimization problem. 
( )( (1 )C W C Wtn ndm tn ndmδ δΠ ⋅ + −
W
ndmπ
)π
(WndmΠ )⋅
( )( )
( )( ) ,
( )
(1 )
max
T
tndm
T
tndm
T
tadm
T
tndm
T
tndm
C W C W T
tn ndm tn ndm tndm
P T
ndm tndm
n N t
SI reg SI T
m d sndm sndm tndmSALES d D
SX TPURCH s S t sndm tndmFLOW
INJ
XTR adm
SALES
PURCH
days INJ
XTR
δ δ π
π
γ τ τ
τ
τ
∈
∈
∈
  
Π ⋅ + −  
−   +   
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−

 
( )
( )
m M
A,reg A T
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a A t
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∈
∈
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

 (A.5) 
Traders need to preserve mass balance at every node n in every season d of every year m:24 
s.t. 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
, ,
T T
tndm a tadm tndm
a a n
T T T
tndm tadm tndm tndm
a a n
PURCH loss FLOW XTR
SALES FLOW INJ n d m ϕ
+
−
∈
∈
+ − + =
+ + ∀


T
T
, , S
 (A.6) 
In each yearly storage cycle the total extracted volumes must equal the loss-corrected injection 
volumes. 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ,T Ts d tsdm d tsdm tsdm
d D d D
loss days INJ days XTR n s S N t d m ϕ
∈ ∈
− = ∀ ∈   (A.7) 
Some traders have contractual obligations, that can be modeled as follows:25  
 ( ), ,T Ttadm tadm tadmFLOW CON a d m ε≥ ∀ T
                                                           
 (A.8) 
All other constraints are nonnegativity of variables: 
 0 , ,TtndmSALES n d m≥ ∀  (A.9) 
(A.10)  0 , ,TtndmPURCH n d m≥ ∀  
 
24 Pipeline losses are accounted for in this mass-balance equation; in contrast the storage loss-rate is accounted for 
in the storage-cycle constraint, equation (A.7). 
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(A.11)  0 , ,TtadmFLOW a d m≥ ∀  
 0 , ,TtndmINJ n d m≥ ∀  (A.12) 
 0 , ,TtndmXTR n d m≥ ∀  (A.13) 
The inverse demand curve  is presented later.  ( )WndmΠ ⋅
The next section describes the transmission system operator, who is responsible for assigning available 
capacities to the traders needing transport capacity for exporting gas; and for expansions of the 
international transportation capacities. The international high pressure pipelines as well as the various 
steps of the LNG supply chain are represented as arcs with appropriate costs, losses and capacities. The 
underlying assumption is that all transportation infrastructure agents are regulated players. 
Transmission system operator problem 
The transmission system operator (TSO) provides an economic mechanism to efficiently allocate 
international transport capacity to traders. The TSO maximizes the discounted profit resulting from 
selling arc capacity to traders AadmSALES  minus investment costs for capacity expansions
A
amΔ . Loosely 
speaking, regulators base the maximum infrastructure usage charges (regulated fees) on the long-term 
marginal costs, i.e. the operating and maintenance costs plus a margin to earn a return on investment. 
In the model we make the simplified assumption that the regulated fees collected from the traders are 
to equal the costs; therefore the profit margin is equal to the congestion fee Aadmτ . Note that these 
congestion fees are not paid in actuality, but merely facilitate the efficient allocation of a scarce capacity 
in the model. 
 maxA
adm
A
am
A A A
m d adm adm am am
SALES m M d D a a
days SALES bγ τ
∈ ∈
Δ
 
− Δ      A  (A.14) 
The assigned capacity is restricted by the available capacity. Available arc capacity at arc a is the sum of 
the initial arc capacity 
A
amCAP  and capacity expansions in the previous years '
'
A
am
m m<
Δ .  
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( ), ,AA A AamSALES CAP a d m α≤ + Δ ∀   '
'
adm am adm
m m<
(A.15) 
here may be budgetary or other limits to the yearly capacity expansions: 
 
T
( ),A A Aam am ama m ρΔ ≤ Δ ∀  (A.16) 
Lastly, all variables are nonnegative: 
 (A.17) 
 (A.18) 
 
The following presents the storage operator problem. 
The storag onomic m
traders. Th
0AadmSALES ≥  
0AamΔ ≥  
Storage Operator Problem  
e operator provides an ec echanism to efficiently allocate storage capacity to 
e storage operator maximizes the discounted profit resulting from selling injection capacity 
SI
sdmSALES  and extraction capacity 
SX
sdmSALES  to traders. In equilibrium the capacity sales-rates 
SI
sdmSALES  and 
SX
sdmSALES must be equal to the aggregate injection and extraction rates. Similarly as for 
the TSO, we take as a starting point that the regulator sets a maximum capacity usage fee based on the 
long-term ma al costs. Our sim ied assumption is that the regulated fees collected from the traders 
equal the operating costs and therefore in the model the profit margin is equal to the congestion fees 
for injectionτ SI
rg plifin
sdm  and extractionτ
SX
sdm . Note that these congestion fees are not paid in actuality, cf. the 
s for injection and extraction, costs may be accrued 
jection, total working gas: 
pipeline cong
to expand 
estion fees. Besides the re
pacities for in
gulated tariff
traction and ca ex SI SI SX SX SW SWsm sm m sm sm smb b bΔ + Δ + Δ . s
 ,
,
, ,
sdm
SX
SI SX SW
sm sm sm
SALES m M d D sm sm sm sm sm sm
SALES
b b b∈ ∈
Δ Δ Δ
max
SI
sdm
SI SI SX SX
sdm sdm sdm sdm
m d SI SI SX SX SW SW
SALES SALES
days
τ τγ
 +  
− Δ − Δ − Δ   (A.19)    
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The aggregate injection rate in any season is restricted by the injection capacity (A.20). Injection 
capacities can be expanded; therefore the aggregate previous yearly expansions '
'
SI
sm
m m<
Δ  must be 
d to the initial capacity adde
S
sINJ to determine the total capacity. Equat (A.21) pro mits to 
extraction from storage and condition (A.22) represents the working gas limitations. 
s.t.  
ion vides the li
( )'
'
,
SISI SI SI
ssdm sm sdm
m m
SALES CAP m d α
<
≤ + Δ ∀  (A.20) 
  ( )'
'
,
SXSX SX SX
ssdm sm sdm
m m
SALES CAP m d α
<
≤ + Δ ∀  (A.21) 
 ( )'
'
SSX SW SW
sd sdm sm sm
d D m m
days SALES WG m α
∈ <
≤ + Δ ∀   (A.22) 
The limitations to allowable capacity expansions are modeled as follows: 
 ( )SI SI SIsm sm smm ρΔ ≤ Δ ∀  (A.23) 
( )SX SX SX
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 sm sm smm ρΔ ≤ Δ ∀ (A.24) 
 
 
( )SW SW SWsm sm smm ρΔ ≤ Δ ∀  (A.25) 
ge facility (the storage cycle constraint) including accounting for 
(for each separate trader) in equation (A.7).  
 (A.29) 
 (A.30) 
Note that mass balance for each stora
losses, is dealt with 
Lastly, all variables are nonnegative: 
 0 ,≥ ∀SIsdmSALES m d  (A.26) 
 0 ,≥ ∀SXsdmSALES m d  (A.27) 
 0SIsm mΔ ≥ ∀  (A.28) 
0SXsm mΔ ≥ ∀  
0SWsm mΔ ≥ ∀  
Market-Clearing Conditions 
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The following are the market-clearing conditions that tie the various optimization problems er 
into one equilibrium problem. 
Market-clearing between producers and traders: 
P
Market-clearing for storage injection capacity and volumes: 
 
 togeth
( )t p ( )
( )( ) , ,P Tpdm tn p dm n p dmSALES PURCH p d m π= ∀  (B.1) 
( )( )
( ), ,SI T SIsdm tsdm sdm
t T N s
SALES INJ s d m τ
∈
= ∀  (B.2) 
Market-clearing for storage extraction capacity and volumes: 
 ( )( )
( ), ,SX T SXsdm tsdm sdmSALES XTR s d m τ= ∀  
t T N s∈
(B.3) 
Market-clearing between the TSO and the traders for arc capacity and flows: 
 
A
(B.4) 
 as the inverse demand curve: 
( ), ,A Tadm tadm adm
t
SALES FLOW a d m τ= ∀  
The clearing of the final demand is represented
( )( ) ( ), ,W W W W T W
t
INT SLP SALES n d mπ πΠ ⋅ = = + ⋅ ∀ndm ndm ndm ndm tndm ndm  (B.5)
 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Conditions 
In the KKT’s the left-hand sides (relative to the -sign) are the equations, the right-hand sides the 
variables. Most primal variables are denoted as normal words in capitals, except pacity 
expansions, which are denoted by Greek letter Δ; all dual variables are written as Greek symbols. 
KKT conditions for the producer’s problem 
⊥
for ca
( )( )( )0 0P Ppm pdmP
pdm
c SALESP PR PH P
m d n p dm pdm d pdm pdmSALES
days days SALES d mγ π α α∂ ∂≤ − + + + ⊥ ≥ ∀  , , (C.1) 
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0
P P
pmPR SALES≤ − 0, ,PRpdm pdm d mα⊥ ≥ ∀  (C.2) 
0 0P PHp d pdm pdm
m M d D
PH days SALES α
∈ ∈
≤ − ⊥ ≥   (C.3) 
KKT conditions for the trader’s problem 
, , ,≥ ∀ (C.4) 
 ( ( )), , (C.5) 
0, ,∀
 , ,∀ (C.7) 
 , , , ,
 
(C.8) 
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  (C.9) 
( ) ( )( )0 1 , , , , ,T T Ss d tsdm d tsdm tsm
d d
loss days INJ days XTR free n s S N t d mϕ= − − ∀ ∈   (C.10) 
 , , , (C.11) 
KKT conditions for the transmission system operator’s problem 
 , , (C.12) 
 
0 0T T Ttadm tadm tadmFLOW CON a d mε≤ − ⊥ ≥ ∀  
0 0A A Ad m adm adm admdays SALES a d mγ τ α≤ − + ⊥ ≥ ∀  
'
'
0 0
A A A A
am am adm adm
m m
CAP SALES a d mα
<
≤ + Δ − ⊥ ≥ ∀  , , (C.13) 
 ,m (C.14) 
 
'
'
0 0A Am am adm am am
d D m m
b aγ α ρ
∈ >
≤ − + ⊥ Δ ≥ ∀  A A
0 0A A Aam am am a mρ≤ Δ − Δ ⊥ ≥ ∀  , (C.15) 
34 
 
nditions for storage operator’s problem 
, ,
 , , (C.17) 
 , (C.18) 
 , (C.19) 
 , (C.20) 
 
KKT co
 0 0γ τ α≤ − + ⊥ ≥ ∀SI SI SId m sdm sdm sdmdays SALES d m  (C.16) 
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'
'
0 0γ α ρ
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d D m m
b m  
'
'
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∈ >
≤ − + ⊥ Δ ≥ ∀ SX SX SX SXm sm sdm sm sm
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b m  
'
'
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∈ >
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b m  
'
'
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SI SI SI SI
sm sm sdm sdm
m m
CAP SALES m dα
<
≤ + Δ − ⊥ ≥ ∀  0 , (C.21) 
  '
'
0   
SI SX SX SX
sm sm sdm sdm
m m
CAP SALES m dα
<
≤ + Δ − ⊥ ≥ ∀  0 , (C.22) 
 '
'
0   
S SW SX SW
s sm d sdm sm
m m d D
WG days SALES mα
< ∈
≤ + Δ − ⊥ ≥ ∀   0 (C.23) 
 0 0ρ≤ Δ − Δ ⊥ ≥ ∀SI SI SIsm sm sm m  (C.24) 
0 0ρ≤ Δ − Δ ⊥ ≥ ∀SX SX SXsm sm sm m   (C.25) 
 0 0ρ≤ Δ − Δ ⊥ ≥ ∀SW SW SWsm sm sm m  (C.26) 
Market-clearing conditions 
, , (C.27) 
 , , (C.28) 
 , , (C.29) 
 , , (C.30) 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )0 ,
P T P
pdm t n n p dm n p dm
t n T p
SALES PURCH free p d mπ
∈
= − ∀  
0 ,A T Aadm tadm adm
t
SALES FLOW free a d mτ= − ∀  
( )( )
0 ,SI T SIsdm tsdm sdm
t T N s
SALES INJ free s d mτ
∈
= − ∀  
( )( )
0 ,SX T SXsdm tsdm sdm
t T N s
SALES XTR free s d mτ
∈
= − ∀  
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, ,
( )
ndm ndm ndm tndm ndm
t T n
0 ,W W W T WINT SLP SALES free n d mπ π= − − ⋅ ∀   
∈
 
 
(C.31) 
 
The combination of all the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the market-clearing conditions and inverse 
curves form the MCP. All minimization objective functions are convex and differentiable and all 
asible regions are polyhedral, thus, the KKT points for this system are necessary and sufficient for 
optimal solutions.  
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 8. Figures 
 
Figure 1 LNG as World Inter-Regional Natural Gas Trade* by Type in the Reference Scenario (WEO 2008, IEA) 
 
Figure 2 Natural Gas Spot Prices at Henry Hub ($/ million BTU), source: 
http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/124.htm 
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Figure 3 Natural Gas Spot source: WGI, World Gas Intelligence,  
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 Figure 4 Depiction of Modeling Components for the World Gas Model 
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Figure 5 Producer-Trader Combinations (left, standard; right, cartel) 
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Figure 6 World Gas Model Base Case, Average Wholesale Prices by Regions, $/thousand cubic feet 
 
 
 
Figure 7 World Gas Model Base Case, Exports (+) and Imports (+) by Region, bcm for 2030 
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 Figure 8 World Gas Model Cartel Cases, Average Wholesale Prices by Regions, $/million BTU, 2020 
 
 
 
Figure 9 World Gas Model Cartel Cases, Average Wholesale Prices by Regions, $/million BTU, 2030 
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Figure 10 World Gas Model Cartel Cases, Consumption by Regions, billions of cubic meters/year, 2020 
 
 
Figure 11 World Gas Model Cartel Cases, Consumption by Regions, billions of cubic meters/year, 2030 
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 Figure 12 World Gas Model Cartel Cases, Comparison of Prices for Europe (2020 and 2030), $/MMBTU 
 
 
Figure 13 World Gas Model Cartel Cases, Net Exports by Regions, billions of cubic meters/year, 2020 
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 Figure 14 World Gas Model Cartel Cases, Profits by Regions, billion$/year, 2020 
 
 
Figure 15 World Gas Model Cartel Cases, Profits by Regions, billion$/year, 2030 
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Figure 16 GECF member countries for cartel cases 
  
 
Figure 17 Production by region in billions of cubic meters for 2020, Cartel Cases 
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Figure 18 Production by region in billions of cubic meters for 2030, Cartel Cases 
 
Figure 19 World Gas Model Sensitivity Cases, Average Wholesale Prices by Regions, $/million BTU, 2020 
45 
 
 Figure 20 World Gas Model Sensitivity Cases, Average Wholesale Prices by Regions, $/million BTU, 2030 
 
Figure 21 World Gas Model Sensitivity Cases, Consumption by Regions, billions of cubic meters/year, 
2020 
46 
 
 Figure 22  World Gas Model Sensitivity Cases, Consumption by Regions, billions of cubic meters/year, 
2030 
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Appendix 
This Appendix provides tabular data to support the figures and conclusions. 
Region    Base GECF GECF+Caspian GECF+Caspian+Middle East 
Africa 2.45 2.05 2.08 2.12 
Asia-Pacific 5.64 5.96 6.10 6.34 
Caspian 2.37 2.83 1.70 1.70 
Europe 8.39 9.45 10.50 11.11 
Mid-East 2.90 3.15 3.22 2.69 
N. America 6.76 6.79 6.80 6.80 
Russia 2.53 2.31 2.41 2.43 
S. America 7.42 7.37 7.42 7.61 
Table 6 Prices by region in $/MMBTU for 2020, Cartel Cases 
Region    Base GECF GECF+Caspian GECF+Caspian+Middle East 
Africa 2.51 2.20 2.22 2.27 
Asia-Pacific 7.20 7.73 7.99 8.33 
Caspian 3.09 3.93 2.20 2.24 
Europe 10.13 11.61 12.85 13.82 
Mid-East 3.45 3.68 3.79 3.14 
N. America 8.01 8.02 8.03 8.04 
Russia 3.32 2.95 3.05 3.10 
S. America 7.77 8.51 8.59 8.78 
Table 7 Prices by region in $/MMBTU for 2030, Cartel Cases 
 
Region    Base GECF GECF+Caspian GECF+Caspian+Middle 
East 
Africa 118.6 125.2 124.6 124 
Asia-Pacific 504 487.2 480.8 466.6 
Caspian 130.4 123.5 140.4 140.4 
Europe 707.4 660.5 610.2 584.1 
Mid-East 377.2 359.8 352.1 387 
N. America 744.2 742.7 742.5 742.5 
Russia 439.3 465.8 454.8 451.9 
S. America 151.3 150.8 150.4 148.3 
Table 8 Consumption by region in billions of cubic meters for 2020, Cartel Cases 
Region    Base GECF GECF+Caspian GECF+Caspian+Middle 
East 
Africa 136.6 141.6 141.2 140.2 
Asia-Pacific 613.8 586.8 572.7 552.8 
Caspian 161.7 147.8 176.3 175.8 
49 
 
Europe 761.6 700 643.7 604.5 
Mid-East 550.3 527.5 512.5 568.7 
N. America 825.7 825.4 825 824.4 
Russia 461.6 506.1 494.3 488.4 
S. America 193.7 186.3 185.4 183.1 
Table 9 Consumption by region in billions of cubic meters for 2030, Cartel Cases 
 
Region    Base GECF GECF+Caspian GECF+Caspian+Middle 
East 
Africa 312.5 268.4 273.2 276.9 
Asia-Pacific 437.3 422.4 424.8 429.8 
Caspian 262.3 285.1 183.3 183.4 
Europe 275.7 293.2 301 306 
Mid-East 476.5 490.3 481.6 440.7 
N. America 725.6 728.2 728.6 728.6 
Russia 647.4 594.5 615.6 620.7 
S. America 163.2 150.5 151.1 152.4 
Table 10 Production by region in billions of cubic meters for 2020, Cartel Cases 
Region    Base GECF GECF+Caspian GECF+Caspian+Middle 
East 
Africa 389.8 299.6 303.7 313.4 
Asia-Pacific 476.2 480.3 481.9 484.7 
Caspian 327.3 345.6 255.1 259.3 
Europe 245.5 257.8 259.8 260.3 
Mid-East 684.7 693.5 676.9 623.6 
N. America 821 821.6 822.1 822.8 
Russia 702.9 659.4 672.9 678.5 
S. America 198.9 190.3 190.2 192.3 
Table 11 Production by region in billions of cubic meters for 2030, Cartel Cases 
 
Region    Base GECF Base 
Low Unconv 
GECF 
Low Unconv 
Base  
Low Tr.cost 
GECF 
Low Tr.cost 
Africa 2.45 2.05 2.48 2.05 2.61 2.04
Asia-Pacific 5.64 5.96 5.65 5.96 5.51 5.92
Caspian 2.37 2.83 2.38 2.83 2.50 3.09
Europe 8.39 9.45 8.40 9.46 8.01 9.12
Mid-East 2.90 3.15 2.90 3.15 2.95 3.24
N. America 6.76 6.79 7.05 7.12 6.58 6.61
Russia 2.53 2.31 2.54 2.31 2.56 2.33
S. America 7.42 7.37 7.44 7.40 7.27 7.29
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Table 12 Prices by Region in 2020, in $/million BTU, Sensitivity Cases 
Region    Base GECF Base 
Low Unconv 
GECF 
Low Unconv 
Base  
Low Tr.cost 
GECF 
Low Tr.cost 
Africa 2.51 2.20 2.56 2.20 2.67 2.19
Asia-Pacific 7.20 7.73 7.23 7.77 6.97 7.63
Caspian 3.09 3.93 3.10 3.94 3.33 4.33
Europe 10.13 11.61 10.18 11.63 9.52 11.02
Mid-East 3.45 3.68 3.47 3.70 3.55 3.85
N. America 8.01 8.02 8.72 8.85 7.69 7.72
Russia 3.32 2.95 3.33 2.95 3.34 2.99
S. America 7.77 8.51 7.78 8.55 7.70 8.28
Table 13 Prices by Region in 2030, in $/million BTU, Sensitivity Cases 
Region    Base GECF Base 
Low Unconv 
GECF 
Low Unconv 
Base  
Low Tr.cost 
GECF 
Low Tr.cost 
Africa 118.6 125.2 118.1 125.2 116 125.3
Asia-Pacific 504 487.2 503.8 487.1 509.7 489.9
Caspian 130.4 123.5 130.3 123.5 128.4 119.7
Europe 707.4 660.5 706.9 660.2 723.6 674.7
Mid-East 377.2 359.8 376.9 359.8 374.3 354.1
N. America 744.2 742.7 730.8 727.4 751.6 749.9
Russia 439.3 465.8 439.1 465.7 436.2 464.2
S. America 151.3 150.8 151.2 150.6 152.6 151.7
Table 14Consumption by Region in 2020, in BCM, Sensitivity Cases 
 
Region    Base GECF Base 
Low Unconv 
GECF 
Low Unconv 
Base  
Low Tr.cost 
GECF 
Low Tr.cost 
Africa 136.6 141.6 135.8 141.6 134 141.7
Asia-Pacific 613.8 586.8 612.6 585.2 623.9 592.9
Caspian 161.7 147.8 161.5 147.6 157.8 141.2
Europe 761.6 700 759.6 699 786.6 723.9
Mid-East 550.3 527.5 549.2 526.1 543.5 513.7
N. America 825.7 825.4 793.5 788 838.6 837.5
Russia 461.6 506.1 460.9 505.9 460 500.5
S. America 193.7 186.3 193.7 186.1 194.3 188.9
Table 15 Consumption by Region in 2030, in BCM, Sensitivity Cases 
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Region    Base GECF Base 
Low Unconv 
GECF 
Low Unconv 
Base  
Low Tr.cost 
GECF 
Low Tr.cost 
Africa 312.5 268.4 313.8 268.5 319.8 267.4
Asia-Pacific 437.3 422.4 437.6 422.5 438.8 423.7
Caspian 262.3 285.1 262.5 285.3 270.6 291
Europe 275.7 293.2 275.9 293.3 271.3 292.6
Mid-East 476.5 490.3 477.1 490.2 483.1 495.2
N. America 725.6 728.2 707.6 711.1 731 733.7
Russia 647.4 594.5 647.7 594.6 651.1 597.8
S. America 163.2 150.5 163.3 151.3 163 151.3
Table 16 Production by Region in 2020, in BCM, Sensitivity Cases 
 
Region    Base GECF Base 
Low Unconv 
GECF 
Low Unconv 
Base  
Low Tr.cost 
GECF 
Low Tr.cost 
Africa 389.8 299.6 397.1 299.7 409.5 297.9
Asia-Pacific 476.2 480.3 476.5 482.2 476.7 480.6
Caspian 327.3 345.6 327.7 345.7 335.1 350.2
Europe 245.5 257.8 246.5 257.9 241.6 257.1
Mid-East 684.7 693.5 687 696.5 698.2 705.2
N. American 821 821.6 771.5 773.5 827.7 828.6
Russia 702.9 659.4 703.7 659.6 703.8 665.9
S. America 198.9 190.3 199.1 192 200.2 193
Table 17 Production by Region in 2030, in BCM, Sensitivity Cases 
 
